Britain’s armed forces are in a difficult position, and the Ministry of Defence shows little sign of learning from the mistakes that helped create it.
That was the thrust of a sharp criticism aimed at Keir Starmer on Tuesday by George Robertson, Tony Blair’s first defence secretary, former Nato secretary general and the author of the latest in a long line of strategic defence reviews. He accused the prime minister of a “corrosive complacency towards defence” and said Starmer was not prepared to make the “necessary investment”.
Robertson’s attack, however, points to a wider problem than the attitude of one prime minister. The defence establishment has spent years facing clear evidence of waste, expensive and poorly judged contracts, and policy choices that have repeatedly avoided dealing with emerging security threats to Britain and other western countries.
The result is a ministry and armed forces that appear ill-equipped for the demands now being placed on them. The criticism is not simply that budgets are tight, but that the system has too often failed to use its resources wisely or to respond decisively to changing strategic realities.
That helps explain why the Treasury remains reluctant to meet the MoD’s demands. A department that has struggled to demonstrate discipline, efficiency and clear thinking is unlikely to inspire confidence when it asks for more money.
Lord Robertson could have aimed his fire at many parts of the defence machine. The accusation of complacency applies not only to ministers, but also to an institution that has repeatedly tolerated poor outcomes while continuing to press for greater spending. Years of warnings have not produced the degree of reform that might have strengthened the case for extra investment.
Instead, the MoD has been left vulnerable to the charge that it is asking the public purse to cover for its own failures. Defence planning has often seemed reactive rather than forward-looking, with too little willingness to confront difficult truths about the shape of future conflict and the capabilities Britain will need.
That matters because the security environment is changing quickly. The threats facing Britain and its allies are no longer limited to the assumptions that guided earlier defence planning, yet the ministry’s record suggests it has been slow to adapt. Strategic caution can be valuable, but prolonged hesitation and repeated misjudgement carry their own costs.
The criticism from Robertson is therefore revealing in more ways than one. It highlights pressure on the current government to treat defence as a serious priority, but it also exposes a longstanding institutional weakness inside the MoD itself. If the armed forces are in a sad state, it is not because of one speech or one spending decision. It is because years of complacency, waste and avoidance have left them there.
The challenge now is whether the government and the ministry can break that pattern. Without a clearer strategy, better accountability and a more honest assessment of Britain’s defence needs, calls for greater investment will continue to meet understandable scepticism.
